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Abstract
This paper examines the complex issue of the triangular relationship between China, Taiwan and 
the United States. Due to its importance to both China and the United States, Taiwan has burdened 
the relationship between the two powers as long and as fierce as any. China considers Taiwan an 
integral part of its territory and has been unwilling to reject the use of force to settle the Taiwan 
issue. Under these conditions, Taiwan has chosen to balance China by aligning itself with the United 
States in order to avoid submission or destruction. Although the U.S. supports a “one-China” policy, 
it is strongly opposed to any move that could change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force. 
While both Beijing and Washington often emphasize positive engagement and dialogue, divergent 
interests of China and the United States over Taiwan, along with their contest for domination in East 
Asia, have remained a focal point of contention that could send the two powers on a collision course. 
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Introduction
The origin of today’s “Taiwan problem” dates back to the days of the 
Chinese Civil War when the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) 
fought with the Chinese Communist Party for control of China. Despite U.S. 
financial and material assistance and logistic support, the Nationalists were 
defeated and forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Since then, China has 
remained divided in two separate political entities, the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. 
The two rival governments, each claiming to be the sole legal government 
of the whole of China, have shared a common stance that there is only 
“one China” and that Taiwan was a part of that China. What they have 
not agreed upon was the claim which government was the rightful ruler 
of the whole country. Since Beijing has never dropped its claim that the 
island was a part of its territory to be brought into the fold by persuasion if 
possible, by force if necessary, cross-strait relations remained strained and 
characterized by animosities, tensions, threats, and military crises. 
As the Cold War divided the world into two spheres of influence, Taiwan 
became an important link in the U.S. anti-communist alliance system 
in East Asia. U.S. President Harry Truman considered Taiwan, along with 
the Philippines and Indo China, important for U.S. security and general 
stability in the Far East. Under this paradigm, Taiwan became a deflector 
shield against “red China” and communism in general. Although the Sino-
Soviet split spurred the United States to switch recognition from the ROC 
to the PRC and establish diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979, Taiwan 
remained deeply integrated in the U.S. sphere of influence. Moreover, 
a few months later the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act 
that would demonstrate U.S. determination to continue military support 
to its informal ally. Under U.S. protection, Taiwan began a process of 
economic, social, and political transformation and rose to the position of 
a respectable member of the international community.
With the end of the Cold War, the United States positioned itself as the 
sole superpower in the world. China was not satisfied with the outcome, 
yet had no choice but to adjust to the international system dominated 
by the United States. Meanwhile, it focused on economic growth, 
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modernization, and international cooperation, buying time to restore its 
power. Eventually, China’s self-confidence increased rapidly and Beijing 
has began to influence the regional affairs from a position of a great 
power. Its assertiveness along its periphery has made many Asian nations 
anxious and concerned of China’s future moves and true intentions in 
the region, despite increased economic and political cooperation with 
China. The same is true for Taiwan. Although the relations between Taipei 
and Beijing are currently on the highest level in decades, longstanding 
political divergences overshadow beneficial cooperation in other fields. 
Moreover, Taiwan is still threatened by Beijing, which claims it may use 
force to retain the island as an “integral” part of China. The fact that 
Taiwan is an informal U.S. ally makes the island a highly sensitive issue in 
Sino-American relations, because a sharp escalation of tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait could provoke a U.S. show of force in support of its ally and 
thus send the two powers on a collision course.
Realism as a theoretical approach to the U.S.-China-
Taiwan relationship 
Realism is the oldest paradigm of international relations. Although 
realists constitute a diverse group, they share the core assumption that 
international politics is defined as a struggle for power. According to the 
realist paradigm, states are the most important actors in world politics that 
seek power, calculate their interests in terms of power and are motivated 
primarily by their national interests. The basic motive driving states is survival. 
No state can ever be certain another state will not use its offensive military 
capabilities. Realists assume that law and morality have a subordinate 
place in international relations, share a generally pessimistic view of 
human nature and believe that the international system is anarchic. 
Under these conditions, each state struggles to ensure its security. In sum, 
realists emphasize the constraints on politics imposed by human selfishness 
(egoism) and the absence of international government (anarchy), which 
require the primacy of power and security in all political life (see Donnelly 
in Burchill and Linklatter 2013: 32).
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In the international system, realists argue, states answer to no higher 
authority and are in constant conflict with other states. Hans Morgenthau 
writes that anybody who operates in international relations enters a conflict 
with others who also strive to achieve their interests by force (Morgenthau 
1985). In their view, a gain to one party means a loss to the other. Regardless 
of variations, all realists tend to view power politics as a zero-sum game 
and anticipate conflicts of interests between the established major power 
and rising challengers. Thucydides and Machiavelli demonstrated that 
the quest for dominance in any competitive political environment is, by 
necessity, continuous and relentless, with all political entities, whether they 
be individuals or states, seeking to expand their power whenever they 
can do so without undue penalty because their circumstances simply 
permit it (Tellis in Shambaugh 2013: 82). 
Some realists believe that a conflict can be postponed, and a rising 
peer competitor deterred in the short to medium term, but in the longer 
term the intrinsic imperative of survival drives states into prolonged – 
and dangerous – competition (Shambaugh 2013: 82). Since the world 
is composed of opposing interests, conflict among competing states is 
inevitable. Realists only disagree over the degree of its intensity.
Realists identify major powers that constitute the system’s poles in the 
international system, as well as middle powers and smaller states that seek 
to define their relations with the major powers. The classic power transition 
pathway pits a rising great power against the status quo leading state and 
it expects that conflict –and perhaps war – will be generated as the rising 
state reaches parity with the declining lead state (Ikenberry 2008: 111).
When a major power is gradually displaced by a new rising power, whose 
ascent to primacy would challenge the existing international order, 
the international system becomes highly unstable. This is known in neo-
realist thinking as power-transition theory. The term “power transition” 
comes from Kenneth Organski’s classical work, World Politics. It refers 
to several important aspects of international relations. First, it is about 
a significant increase of national power in a big nation (in terms of its 
territorial and demographic size) as a result of its genuine and rapid 
economic development. Second, it is the impact of this growing power 
on the international system, especially on the hegemonic position of the 
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dominant nation in this international system (Lai 2011: 5). Power transition 
theory holds that the period when a rising power approaches parity with 
the established power is the most unstable and prone to conflict – what 
Organski and Kugler described as the “crossover” point (see Shambaugh 
2013: 10-11). Historically, such great power transitions have been fertile 
ground for confrontation, since the established power typically resists the 
rising country’s efforts to strengthen its military, seize territory and colonies, 
and otherwise remake its region into a sphere of influence in which the 
other countries must constrain their foreign and sometimes domestic 
politics in ways acceptable to the new hegemon (Weiz 2013: 9).
As a new rising entity challenges the existing balance of security in the 
system, the established power has to deal with the issue whether and to 
what extent this is a peaceful shift or a conflictual transition. The sense of 
strength and weakness upsets the balance of security in the international 
system and results in a security dilemma. According to classical realists, 
“structural anarchy,” or the absence of a central authority to settle 
disputes, is the essential feature of the contemporary system, and gives 
rise to the “security dilemma”: in a self-help system one nation’s search 
for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries insecure, 
any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all others in the system 
absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms 
races and other types of hostile reactions (Holsti 2004: 54). As a result, a 
vicious circle of spiraling (in)security arises in the international system. 
To confront a rising power, the dominant state can sustain its primacy through 
“balancing” and “strategic hedging” tactics. Realists differentiate internal 
balancing, which reallocates resources from other purposes to national 
security, from external balancing, carried out through alliances and other 
(formal and informal) agreements (Donnelly in Burchill and Linklatter 2013: 
38). Morgenthau observed that alliances constitute “the most important 
manifestation of the balance of power” in international systems (See Tow 
in Robinson and Shambaugh 1994: 119). Already Thucydides wrote that 
a state must care of its security by making alliances with other states. It is 
possible for a dominant state to engage with a rising power. 
This engagement can be based on either balancing or containment 
strategy to serve as insurance against uncertain current and future 
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intentions of a rising power. Henry Kissinger emphasizes that the balance 
of power is the only way to ensure international peace. In other words, 
no single entity within the international system should be allowed to gain 
predominance over others. Thus, security is enhanced when power is 
distributed to limit or curb the quest for hegemony.
With respect to middle powers and smaller states, they seek either 
to align (bandwagon) with or against (balancing) a superior power. 
Bandwagoning means that a state aligns itself with a threatening power 
to either neutralize the threat or benefit from the spoils of victory (Kang 
2007: 51). Conversely, a weaker state can balance a major power by 
aligning itself to another great power to avoid submission or destruction. 
A state’s inability to provide for its own security forces it to rely on external 
assistance. Maintaining close relations with a powerful ally, a small state 
can increase its stake in the balance of power game and preserve its 
freedom and independence from absorption by a preponderant power. 
Realists argue that stability and order in the international system are 
the result of skillful manipulations of flexible alliance systems (Evans and 
Newnham 1998: 466).
Realists use a concept of power shift to explain the rise of China and the 
challenge this rise poses to the global domination of the United States. As 
rapid economic growth and technological modernization enabled China 
to expand its political and military power, some observers argue that 
this trend, if it continues, could undermine the U.S.-dominated unipolar 
international system and even dethrone the United States from a position 
of a sole global superpower. According to the realist paradigm, a gain for 
China would result in a loss for the United States. 
That China might already be on the way to overtake the US raises a 
prospect of a power transition within the international system. Thus, 
whether China is a status quo power or one that seeks to revise the 
international system has become a critical issue in Sino-American relations. 
As China’s rise includes not only economic and political power, but also 
the policy that enhances its military capabilities, the United States feels 
less secure and consequently threatened. Whether China’s rise will be 
peaceful or violent is a question that preoccupies scholars and statesmen 
alike … Scholars who examine the consequences of China’s rise through 
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the lenses of either power transition theory or offensive realism predict a 
future of conflict (Fravel 2010: 505). Under these assumptions, the push 
to change the existing distribution of power in China’s favor will raise the 
stakes between the two powers so high that this could send China and 
the United States on a collision course. 
Many realists treat China as an assertive destabilizing power. From a regional 
perspective, many argue that Beijing is challenging Washington’s interests 
in East Asia. They see China as a country that could become a global 
superpower accompanied by an aggressive foreign policy contradicting 
U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Some U.S. observers suspect that 
China’s strategic ambition is to push the United States out of East Asia 
and become the dominant regional hegemon, akin to the Sino-centric 
order of China’s imperial period (Bergsten at al 2006: 125). Henry Kissinger 
highlights that some American strategic thinkers argue that Chinese policy 
pursues two long-term objectives: first, to displace the United States as 
the preeminent power in the Western Pacific; and second, to consolidate 
Asia into an exclusionary bloc deferring to Chinese economic and foreign 
policy interests (Kissinger 2012: 499). In his writings, John Mearsheimer 
expounds his “iron law”: that all powers seek hegemony, are discontent 
with balance of power, and therefore the United States and China are 
no exceptions. This presents, in his view, a grave and future danger to 
the United States and its own hegemonic position in Asia and the world. 
Aaron Friedberg essentially shares Mearsheimer’s view that the United 
States and China are locked in a “contest for supremacy” (Shambaugh 
2013: 11). Robert Kagan emphasizes that China aims “in the near term, 
to replace the United States as the dominant power in East Asia and in 
the long term to challenge America’s position as the dominant power 
in the world (See Dou in Peng Er and Wei 2009: 12). Zbigniew Brzezinski 
anticipated that a strong China could seriously challenge U.S. interests 
in the region and might be much more tempted to resolve the issue of 
Taiwan by force, irrespective of America’s attitude (Brzezinski 1997).
Whether China is a status quo power or one that seeks to revise the 
international system has become a critical issue in the United States. In 
recent years, a number of analysts argued that the rise of modern China 
resembles the rise of Wilhelmine Germany a century ago. Fareed Zakaria 
has written that “like Germany in the late 19th century, China is also growing 
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rapidly but uncertainly into a global system in which it feels it deserves 
more attention and honor. China’s military is a powerful political player, as 
was the Prussian officer corps” (Zakaria 1996). Charles Krauthammer has 
written that “modern China is the Germany of a century ago – a rising, 
expanding, have-not power seeking its place in the sun” (Krauthammer 
2010). As Wilhelmine Germany seized the opportunity to confront Britain 
as the ruling hegemon, some scholars and policy advisers argue that the 
perceived decline of U.S. power could encourage China to challenge 
U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The realist paradigm has its protagonists among Chinese scholars and 
its military establishment as well. This concept stems from ideological 
orthodoxy of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought. China may have discredited 
Maoist ideology, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has definitely not 
abandoned Marxist socialism or Leninist authoritarianism – and certainly has 
not abandoned the ideology of being a great power (Shambaugh 2013: 
7). It has also remained attached to the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought that 
competition among great powers would inevitably lead to war. Although 
Marxism has waned in the post-Mao era, the perception that great powers 
are doomed to collide still persists in the minds of many Chinese leaders who 
in their youth have been socialized and imbued with Marxist notions such as 
hegemony, imperialism, exploitation, struggle, conflict, and the correlation 
of forces. Simply put, the generation of leaders schooled in Marxism and 
Maoism in China is sensitive to the notion and reality of power and conflict. 
This residual Marxist-Maoist legacy of viewing international relation as 
conflict and struggle is compatible to Western international relations theory 
of realism (Dou in Peng Er and Wei 2009: 12-13). Many younger Chinese 
policy analysts embraced the theory of offensive realism which holds that 
a country will try to control its security environment to the full extent that 
its capabilities permit. According to this theory, the United States cannot 
be satisfied with the existence of a powerful China and therefore seeks to 
make its ruling regime weaker and more pro-American. Chinese analysts 
see evidence of this intent in Washington’s calls for democracy and its 
support for what China sees as separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and 
Xinjiang (Nathan and Scobell 2012).
Some leading strategists of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believe that 
“hegemonism of the superpower(s) is still the long term threat to national 
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security” which may pose new security challenges to the PRC. It is implied 
that these superpowers are a “competing United States and Japan” (See 
Wang 1996: 45). Thus, hard-liners in the CCP and within the ranks of the 
People’s Liberation Army urged Beijing to adopt a more assertive policy 
toward Washington. One prominent example of this assertive policy is a 
book, Unrestricted Warfare, published in 1999 by two colonels in the PLA. In 
addition to the military analysis, the underlying assumption of Unrestricted 
Warfare is that the United States is an implacable enemy of China and that 
someday the PRC must confront its adversary militarily (Carpenter 2005: 3). 
In a clear reference to the United States, in April 2013, the official People’s 
Liberation Army Daily stressed that China needed to beef up its defenses 
to deal with a hostile West, bent on undermining it.2 As insecurity can easily 
give rise to hostility, whether Chinese leaders will translate perceived U.S. 
provocations in an aggressive policy toward the United States remains the 
central question in a Sino-American great power game. 
Why Taiwan maters to China
For China, Taiwan is an island that has a deep symbolic meaning. It is a 
vestige of the “century of humiliation” characterized by foreign intervention 
and Western imperialism. The widespread discontent experienced by 
modern China is largely attributable to the continuing memory of the 
humiliation it suffered at the hands of foreign powers throughout the 
nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth century (Camilleri 
1985: 3). 
As a tangible reminder of China’s division and its national humiliation, 
Taiwan evokes a sense of injustice inflicted by foreign powers. From Beijing’s 
perspective, incorporating Taiwan to the motherland is justified, while the 
existence of Taiwan as a separate administrative authority represents an 
injustice. Accordingly, Beijing considers intervention by any foreign power 
in the Taiwan issue as interference in its internal affairs equal to the injustice 
and humiliation China suffered during the period of western imperialism. 
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China’s memory of this period as a time when it was attacked, bullied, 
and torn asunder by imperialists serves as the foundation for its modern 
identity and purpose (Wang 2013). 
For more than six decades, Taiwan has remained an issue of nation building 
and competing conceptions of identity between Beijing and Taipei. Both 
Chinese sides agreed that Taiwan and the mainland were part of the same 
political entity. The disagreement was about which Chinese government 
was the rightful ruler (Kissinger 2012: 140). The key question about Taiwan is 
whether, in fact, it is an independent nation-state, or whether it is merely a 
part of China … This disagreement over Taiwan’s identity lies at the heart 
of the conflict, and is what differentiates Taiwan categorically from China’s 
relations with other East Asian states (Kang 2007: 80). 
Since the first emperor Qin Shi Huang formed the nucleus of united China 
more than two thousand years ago, China experienced invasions, dynastic 
change, national division, and violations of its sovereignty, but it always 
reverted to a unified state. Chinese “unity” as a result is equated in China’s 
national consciousness with the height of the country’s power and prestige, 
while division and disunity are associated with its lowest points of weakness 
and humiliation (Bergsten et al. 2006: 118-119). Thus, the recovery of Taiwan 
to the mainland has been a matter of cohesiveness of the Chinese nation. 
This fixation on the cycle of Chinese history has made the recovery of 
Taiwan seem like a sacred mission (Klintworth 2001). In Beijing’s view, so long 
as Taiwan remained under a separate administrative authority receiving 
foreign and military assistance, the project of founding a “New China” 
would remain incomplete (Kissinger 2012:140). 
Acting as a de facto independent state, Beijing also fears, Taiwan indirectly 
encourages separatist tendencies in regions on the mainland. If it declares 
independence, Taiwan could set a dangerous precedent. Under these 
circumstances, China’s existing minority problems are likely to intensify 
because secessionist movements, for example in Tibet and Xinjiang, 
would be further encouraged (Ross 2002: 55). Thus, de jure independent 
Taiwan could become a serious crack in Chinese sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. China’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are 
China’s fundamental policy goals.3
3 China’s Independent Policy of Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 18, 2003, 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
249
The Taiwan issue is also a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party. The downfall of Communism held major implications for 
China. The regime in Beijing has lost its ideological foundations and tied 
its legitimacy to keeping China “whole”. If it turned out that the CCP is 
not capable to keep all of its territory under its control, confidence in the 
Party would be undermined. As Communism declined as a credible and 
unifying ideology, boosting China’s prosperity, restoring its prestige and 
stature as a great power, and unifying the nation – that is returning Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan to the “motherland” – became critical issues 
to the CCP’s accountability to lead and, arguably, essential elements 
of regime survival itself (Bergsten et al 2006: 119). Derek Mitchell, Asia 
specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explains 
that for the Chinese psyche, the unity of the nation is equated to national 
greatness (Mitchell according to Marquand 2004). In this context, a loss 
of Taiwan would threaten its nationalist credentials to govern and would 
deal a severe blow to China’s prestige and self-confidence, especially 
with its implications for the separatist movements in Tibet and the Muslim 
northwest (Tian 2006: 2).
Since few believe in Marxism-Leninism, the CCP also seeks legitimacy by 
invoking nationalist sentiments. Realizing that communist ideology was not 
popular enough to support their continued monopoly of power, leaders 
in Beijing played up themes of Chinese nationalism to support their rule 
(Sutter 2010: 18). The return of Hong Kong and Macao to the motherland 
was a major event that greatly enhanced national self-confidence of 
the Chinese people on the mainland. It has also boosted the power and 
prestige of the CCP. On the other hand, a de facto independent Taiwan 
enhances the sense of weakness, humiliation, and disgrace. It is also a 
living reproach to the PRC leadership. Thus, the regime in Beijing draws on 
the emotion of resentment in order to strengthen the Party and the state. 
National stability, a strong voice in world affairs, and improved domestic 
economic conditions also serve as a source of legitimacy for the PRC. 
However, lack of political liberalization, strict party control, corruption, 
lack of social care, rural-urban imbalance, and growing wealth disparities 
amplify the sense of disaffection among the Chinese people. Despite 
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indication that the CCP as a party is capable of dealing with some of the 
social tensions that this growth is creating (Westad 2012: 448). Thus, party-
sponsored nationalism, which plays an important role in China’s domestic 
stability, serves as a catalyst for discontent of the Chinese people. 
Greater economic interaction between the mainland and the island 
also plays an important role in Beijing’s Taiwan policy. China is Taiwan’s 
largest trading partner and also the island’s number one destination for 
foreign direct investment. Beijing hopes that the benefits of economic 
cooperation will lead to negotiation with Taipei on the future status of 
Taiwan and, eventually, end with reunification. For the central Chinese 
government, using Taiwanese investors to achieve their political goal of 
unification is the ultimate aim (Lee 2012: 118). Beijing has always hoped that 
Taiwan’s investment in China would improve the climate for reunification 
as well as create disincentives to independence (See Bush in Shambaugh 
2005: 172). PRC officials have explicitly stated that economic interaction 
with Taiwan is intended to promote unification (Roy 2004: 1). This…can 
be seen in one central official’s statement: ‘the main principle of Chinese 
government is “Peaceful reunification: One country, two systems” … the 
purpose of attracting Taiwanese investment is to use economic strength 
for urging political reunification and using civic conversation for enhancing 
official communication’ (Chun-Yi Lee 2012: 8). Given Taiwan’s growing 
trade dependence on the Chinese mainland and the attractiveness of 
China’s enormous market for Taiwanese entrepreneurs and investors, the 
PRC government is often purported to “use business to steer politics” or to 
“use economics to promote unification”. 
Finally, there is the question of Taiwan’s geostrategic position. If it 
controlled the mainland and Taiwan, Beijing would have a strategic 
advantage over any country that could strive for power projection in the 
region. As a rising power, China believes that it must be able to maintain 
strategic advantage over anyone seeking to operate close to its shores. 
Thus, Taiwan will provide the People’s Liberation Army with naval and air 
bases and give it a strategic depth that it currently lacks. The island is also 
important for the PLA’s control of Japan’s southern flank and the Luzon 
Strait, the waterway connecting the South China Sea to the Philippine 
Sea. Controlling the northern and southern waterways, China will have 
the advantage to settle on its own terms longstanding territorial and 
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sovereignty disputes with Japan, the Philippines and other Southeast 
Asian countries. All parties involved consider the disputed territories 
important due to rich fishing areas and possible natural resources like 
oil, gas and mineral deposits. Finally, this could enable China to project 
power onto the major trade routes through which half of the world’s total 
trade passes. Advanced strategic positioning in the region would allow 
China to expand its sphere of influence and strengthen its position in East 
and Southeast Asia. According to one senior Chinese military theorist, 
Taiwan has “far reaching significance to breaking the international forces’ 
blockade against China’s maritime security. … Only when we break this 
blockade shall we be able to talk about China’s rise. … To rise suddenly, 
China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future 
development” (See Dillon 2007: 2)
Under these conditions, Beijing is more than eager to reunite Taiwan with 
the mainland. Thus, it has adopted a policy of mixing military threats with 
peace overtures. However, China is aware that military action will prompt 
a reaction from other states, the United States in particular, and prefers 
peaceful reunification. Beijing proposed that Taiwan should return to the 
motherland under the Hong Kong model, namely, under the “one country, 
two systems” concept. According to that concept, Taiwan would become 
a special administrative region. It would enjoy a high degree of autonomy 
and would keep its military forces. Beijing also upholds that Taiwan’s current 
social and economic systems, its way of life, and its economic and cultural 
ties with foreign countries would not change under the “one country, two 
systems” policy.4 A provision on setting up a special administrative region 
was added to the Constitution of the PRC in 1982.
Why Taiwan matters to the United States
The U.S. perception of the Taiwan issue is fundamentally different from 
the one that China has. One of the reasons why Taiwan matters to the 
United States is certainly an ideological one. The Americans deeply 
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believe that democracy and prosperity at home depend on continued 
economic expansion and promotion of its values, such as free market, 
freedom, human rights, and liberal democracy abroad. To sustain these 
values throughout the world is deeply rooted in American ideology and 
foreign policy. Introducing market economy and liberal democracy to its 
society, Taiwan has become a respectable member of the international 
community. The United States praise Taiwan for that. For Washington, 
“Taiwan is the only place among Chinese-speaking people that enjoys 
true democracy and realizes the values that the U.S. also stands for 
– democracy, human rights and freedom.”5 The United States often 
emphasize Taiwan’s successful transition from authoritarianism to liberal 
democracy. Since it is rich, liberal, and democratized, some analysts 
believe that the island could be a role model for mainland China as it 
demonstrates an alternative model to Chinese communism. 
There is also the question of economic interests. Despite having a 
population of 23 million, in 2011 Taiwan was the 10th largest trading 
partner, the 15th largest export destination for the United States and its 
10th largest source of imports. Although there are a few issues that proved 
contentious, bilateral economic relations between the United States and 
Taiwan have been generally positive. 
The relevance of Taiwan to the United States lies also in its geostrategic 
position.  Taiwan is an important strategic asset for any power that wants 
to secure a “higher ground” in the region. The geostrategic value of 
Taiwan is in the fact that the island is part of the “first island chain”, an 
arc stretching from the Aleutians in the north to Borneo in the south that 
locks the Yellow Sea, South China Sea and East China Sea.6 For the United 
States, controlling the arc means obstructing China’s potential expansion 
from its shores deeper into the Pacific. 
Many strategists emphasize that for now China is “contained” by a 
proximate chain of islands extending southward from Japan, through the 
Ryukyu’s, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia. To 
get into the Pacific Ocean, China’s naval vessels must go through one of 
5 “AIT stresses Taiwan’s ‘undoubted’ importance to US”, The China Post, March 12, 2012, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/
taiwan/foreign-affairs/2012/03/12/334339/AIT-stresses.htm
6 Interview with Lu Yeh-chung, assistant professor on the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University, 
Taipei, Taiwan, November 2012.
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the various choke points between these islands. If Taiwan were to become 
part of China, this would change. China’s navy would no longer be 
hemmed in, and would be able to extend its reach to the “second island 
chain” – Guam, the Marianas and some other small islands in the central 
Pacific – not much of a barrier (Cooper 2011). Thus, Taiwan enables the 
United States to block China virtually at its gates. 
The United States is concerned that in the hands of China Taiwan would 
serve as the main harbor for its naval expansion in the Asian waters and 
further, which could threaten its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan’s 
east-coast ports would give China’s submarines a huge benefit. From 
Taiwan, they would be able to quickly get into deep water where they 
could not be detected and could proceed to the American west coast to 
show their wares and threaten the United States (see Cooper 2011). 
Moreover, due to its proximity to the Western Pacific sea-lanes of 
communication that run from the Straits of Malacca to Japan, South Korea 
and eastwards, a de facto independent Taiwan enables the United States 
to maintain control of East Asian waterways, as well as China’s domestic 
waterway linking the South China Sea to the East China Sea. In this way, 
the United States can keep China locked on its shores and maintain 
control of strategic waterways important for the free flow of commerce 
and naval maneuvers in the case of unexpected crises. Thus, the United 
States can much more easily secure its influence in this dynamic region. 
Finally, by supporting Taiwan the United States sends a clear message to 
its other allies that it will stay committed to their security as well. Cutting 
off an old U.S. ally would transform the calculus of other allies who might 
plausibly wonder whether the U.S. commitment to their security is flexible 
as it was towards Taiwan. If the United States reneged on this commitment 
and allowed the mainland to reintegrate Taiwan forcibly into China, then 
America’s commitment to Japan, as well as reliability in the eyes of its 
other allies in East Asia, would suffer grievous harm (Art 2008: 276). Since 
the United States is willing to “remain engaged” in the region and “keep 
credible economic and strategic commitments”, abandoning Taiwan 
would certainly be counterproductive to its interests in East Asia. Taiwan is 
an important link in the network of U.S. security alliances. 
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Why Taiwan matters to the Taiwanese
It would be senseless to discuss the Taiwan issue without emphasizing the 
importance of Taiwan to the Taiwanese. After all, the Taiwanese care 
about Taiwan more than anyone else does. In the first place, there is the 
issue of political legitimacy. Although both the PRC and the ROC remain 
firm to the concept that there is one, undivided sovereignty of China, 
Taipei claims that the ROC is the sole legitimate representative of that 
sovereignty, not the PRC. Whether the ROC or the PRC is the legitimate 
Chinese government has been the main disagreement between Taipei 
and Beijing since 1949. Taipei does not oppose the possibility of unification, 
but it supports the idea of a country unified in its own image. That would 
mean reunification under Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People – 
nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood (or social welfare). 
This concept is contrary to Beijing’s concept of “one country, two systems” 
which implies that the central government for the reunified China be under 
four so-called cardinal principles, namely, complete adherence to the 
Communist party leadership, devotion to socialism, guidance by Marxist-
Leninist-Maoist thought, and rule by a dictatorship of the proletariat (See 
Yu 1990: 197). 
Taiwanese values and principles of democracy, freedom and human 
rights are incompatible with the political system of China. Taiwan has 
abjured authoritarianism and moved from martial law to the rule of law, 
experiencing impressive economic growth and political liberalization 
within the last three decades. Under these conditions, Taiwan is not willing 
to accept the supreme rule of the central government in Beijing, not even 
under the concept of “one country, two systems”, although it implies that 
Taiwan may keep the existing capitalist system and its way of life “for a 
long period of time”. Taipei is cautious about Beijing’s promises, namely, 
for how long the PRC is prepared to exercise self-restraint, as well as how 
well it could manage the proposed capitalist enclave of Taiwan. Beijing’s 
jurisdiction over Hong Kong made the Taiwanese pessimistic about the 
proposed “one country, two systems” model. Interference of the Chinese 
officials in many aspects of Hong Kong life in the past few years made the 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
255
Taiwanese less enthusiastic about the one country, two systems formula.7 
Beijing’s recent decision to restrain universal suffrage for the election of 
the Hong Kong’s chief executive, which largely ignored the demands of 
pro-democracy groups that have staged several large protests calling for 
free and direct elections, breaks any illusion that Taiwan would one day 
willingly agree to the “one country, two systems” arrangement.
Finally, the Taiwanese still remember the Tiananmen Square massacre 
of 1989. For many Taiwanese, brutal repression of peaceful protests by 
the Chinese government highlighted the true nature of the Communist 
regime. The massacre was clear evidence of insurmountable differences 
between China and Taiwan. 
A poll taken by the Election Study Center of Taiwan’s National Chengchi 
University in 2012 showed that while there remains a significant difference 
between Taiwan’s and China’s political, economic and social conditions, 
77 percent of respondents opposed unification and 14 percent were 
in favor. However, if there were little difference in conditions between 
Taiwan and China, 33 percent would support unification, with 58 percent 
opposed.8 Many observers believe that the only condition under which 
Taiwan could accept unification would be on the basis of the mainland’s 
democratization, a prospect not immediately visible on the horizon 
(Bergsten et al. 2006: 137). 
Another important factor is the issue of national identity. The mainlanders 
who fled to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War in 1949 regarded themselves 
as Chinese. However, a demographic shift on the island resulted with the 
birth of a new, Taiwanese, identity. With the passage of nearly six decades, 
most members of the émigré generation have died. Consequently, 
the number of people who identify themselves as Taiwanese has been 
increasing steadily in the last twenty years. 
A series of polls taken over the last two decades by the Election Study center 
at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University shows the sense of Taiwanese 
7 For examples of Beijing’s interference in Hong Kong life see “One Country, Two Systems: Human Rights in Hong Kong” 
by Emily Lau, The Diplomat Blogs, March 12, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/one-country-two-systems-
human-rights-in-hong-kong/; and Ted Gallen Carpenter, America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over 
Taiwan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 78-79.
8 “Chinese threats impede unification: US expert”, Taipei Times, April 28, 2013, p. 3
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identity is growing, while the sense of Chinese identity is declining. The 
last poll taken in December 2012, shows that the number of respondents 
who consider themselves as Taiwanese reached 54.3 percent, while the 
number of those who regard themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese 
decreased to 38.5 percent. The “Chinese only” faction fell to a miserable 
3.6 percent.9
The increased sense of Taiwanese identity significantly decreased the 
chances of unification with the mainland. Nevertheless, that does not 
mean that a majority of Taiwanese support immediate independence; 
most of them still favor the status quo. However, as the Taiwan-born 
population increases on the island, the trend towards independence is 
likely to become greater. 
The reluctance to unify with the mainland lies in the fact that for most of the 
Taiwanese, especially for the young, China is an alien, even threatening 
place. They fear (with good reason) that seeking formal independence 
would provoke a crisis, and further, that the island might lose the impressive 
quality of life that it has painstakingly built up over the decades in a war 
with the PRC (Carpenter 2005: 76). Under these conditions, favoring the 
status quo seems a right choice for most of the Taiwanese. In an analysis 
of polling data from Taiwan, Duke University political science professor 
Emerson Niou concluded that while China’s threat deters independence, 
it also decreases the chances of unification. Asked if they would favor a 
declaration of independence if it caused China to attack Taiwan, nearly 
30 percent of respondents said “yes”, while nearly 60 percent said “no”. 
However, if a declaration of independence would not cause China to 
attack, 70 percent would favor it, while 20 percent would not.10
Finally, there is the issue of economy. Taipei initially intended to use 
its economic muscle to gain political concessions from Beijing for 
recognition of its sovereign status. When this failed, it increasingly resorted 
to controlling the pace of cross-Strait economic interactions pending 
positive gestures from Beijing (Tian 2006: 3). Nevertheless, in the last two 
decades, Taiwan and China have built one of the most intertwined and 
9 Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked  in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU 
(1992-2012), http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm
10 “Chinese threats impede unification: US expert”, Taipei Times, April 28, 2013, p. 3
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important economic relationships in Asia. Since Ma Ying-jou of KMT won 
the presidential elections in 2008, the restrictions on cross-Strait economic 
and political exchanges disappeared rapidly. Taipei and Beijing have 
signed a string of economic and technical agreements that have further 
liberalized and normalized cross-Strait economic relations in recent 
years. The most important documents signed since Ma’s inauguration is 
the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in November 
2009 and the controversial cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010. For Taipei, the ECFA is not merely a long-
term mechanism that allows Taiwan to continuously expand lucrative 
cross-Strait business opportunities, but also a hope for Taiwan to have 
more opportunities for participating in regional economic affairs in East 
Asia so as to avoid being marginalized and isolated from the ongoing East 
Asian economic integration. President Ma pointed out that signing the 
ECFA with China was aimed at helping the Taiwanese to do business and 
thus strengthen Taiwan’s competitiveness (Liou 2011:173).
It is evident that cross-Strait economic interaction has proved beneficial 
for the island. Taiwan runs a large trade surplus largely because of 
its surplus with the mainland. Although exports to mainland China 
traditionally involved taking advantage of cheap labor for final assembly 
and re-export to the west, the mainland Chinese market has become 
increasingly important as a source of final demand as well – a trend that 
has only intensified with the coming of the global financial crisis and 
China’s increase in relative strength vis-à-vis Europe and the United States 
(Rosen and Wang 2011: 95 in Burdekin, Shen and Whited 2013: 7) Thus, 
the business community has become increasingly opposed to the idea of 
independence for Taiwan simply because the economic importance of 
China is too strong (see Kang 2007: 97). Utilizing traditional subcontracting 
arrangements with firms relocated to the mainland, parent firms in Taiwan 
provide intermediate materials to subcontractors and pay processing fees 
only for qualified final products, which they then export to world markets 
through networks outside the mainland. This strategy of capitalizing on 
a combination of the cheap labor of mainland China and Taiwanese 
production efficiency has proved successful and promises significant 
returns to both the investing and the invested parties (Tian 2006: 67). Those 
who support stronger economic interaction with the mainland see rapid 
development on the Chinese mainland as an economic opportunity that 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
258
may enrich individuals as well as Taiwanese society. Thus, they argue that 
the government should take on measures facilitating the growth of cross-
Strait economic interactions (Wang et al. 2010: 160-161). After all, the 
business community has invested too much to risk everything by actively 
supporting Taiwan’s independence. 
Despite an active policy of rapprochement with the mainland, many 
in Taiwan have been cautious toward deeper economic integration 
with China due to possible negative consequences. Those who warn of 
speedy integration with the mainland emphasize that the integration, if 
uncontrolled, would endanger the domestic economy and marginalize 
it within the global trading system. For Taiwan’s pro-independence 
advocates, deeper cross-Strait economic integration is viewed as a 
serious threat that may deprive them of the window of opportunity 
to seek permanent separation from the mainland. Accordingly, they 
have been intensifying their efforts to harden a sense of “Taiwanese 
subjectivity” in order to keep the Taiwanese people away from 
identifying with China or the Chinese again (Tian 2006: 153).
Many also fear that it would increase the island’s political vulnerability. 
Some analysts argue that deepening cross-Strait economic ties is 
a potential threat to Taiwan’s national security.11 Taiwanese security 
planners are concerned that Taiwan’s business – particularly its high-
tech firms – may be indirectly helping to strengthen the PRC’s military 
capabilities (Carpenter 2005: 80). Bush summarizes that growing 
economic interdependence concerns take three forms. First, some 
worry about the “hostage effect”, believing that Taiwanese companies 
will become so dependent on the mainland that the island will become 
vulnerable to economic leverage from Beijing. The second concern 
is about the “fifth column effect”. According to this view, Taiwanese 
businessmen on the mainland will become a lobby for the PRC and 
a tool that will help China accomplish its political agenda. The third 
is the “hollowing-out effect”, or the concern that the movement of 
manufacturing across the Taiwan Strait will leave Taiwan economically 
weak (See Bush in Shaumbaugh 2005: 174).
11 For a detailed analysis see Denny Roy, “Cross-Strait Economic Relations: Opportunities Outweigh Risks”, Occasional 
Paper Series, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, April 2004.
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The public is also cautious about the course of economic integration 
with China. Although 56 percent thought Taiwan should strengthen its 
economic and trade relations with China, a clear majority – 67 percent 
– believed that if Taiwan’s economy was overly dependent on China, 
then Beijing might use its economic leverage to coerce Taipei into making 
political concessions.12 Since the end of 2009, the Ma government has 
made great efforts to explain the ECFA to Taiwanese people. Taiwanese 
people were afraid that the signing of ECFA denoted the end of Taiwanese 
product competitiveness with mainland products, especially agricultural 
products because signing the ECFA also means tearing down the tariff for 
importing mainland products to Taiwan (Lee 2012: 116). The occupation 
of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan and the related mass protests that happened 
in March and April 2014 revealed intense popular opposition to the 
proposed Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement with China.
The major concern of those in Taiwan who warn against speedy integration 
is not linked only to economic considerations. It is also, and maybe most 
of all, the fear that integration will endanger Taiwan’s sovereignty and 
encourage Chinese military adventurism in the strait (Keng and Shubert 
2010: 309). 
China’s ascent and the security of the Taiwan Strait
Following the end of the bipolar, Cold War world, Chinese leaders, scholars 
and policy advisers have embraced Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that China 
should strategically adopt a low profile in international relations and 
bide its time while it modernizes and strengthens itself (See Ding 2009: 
103). China accepted a new, unipolar system dominated by the United 
Sates and focused on economic growth, domestic stability, and global 
economic interchange, especially with the developed economies of 
Asia and the West. Beijing recognized that its economic and diplomatic 
12 “Chinese threats impede unification: US expert”, Taipei Times, April 28, 2013, p. 3
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success placed it in a more prominent position to operate more actively 
within regional and world affairs (Sutter 2010: 103). 
Leaving behind the low profile in the international system, China tries 
to portray itself as a responsible global player. Its goals, in the official 
formulations, are a “harmonious society” and a “harmonious world” 
(Kissinger 2012: 458). In 1997, China unveiled a “New Security Concept” 
emphasizing peaceful coexistence, mutually beneficial economic 
contacts, dialogue among states to increase trust, and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes as its core interests (Kang 2007: 84). Beijing’s foreign 
policy documents and statements repeatedly affirm China’s adherence 
to principles of peace, openness, development, equality and democracy 
among nations, cooperation, dialogue, consultation, justice, and win-win 
results (Bergsten et al. 2006: 128). China’s new security approach seeks to 
ensure that China’s rise is peaceful and that its economic development 
and military growth is not a threat to the region or the world. “Externally, 
the country will seek peace, cooperation, a win-win situation and a 
harmonious world”, Chinese President Xi Jinping said when defining 
China’s national security goals (Tiezzi 2014).
China’s policy of gradual accommodation with as many states as possible 
enabled it to establish a new framework of cooperation with most of its 
Asian neighbors. This policy has provided China a strategic opportunity 
to enhance its regional position and create economic benefit for both 
China and its neighbors. Using what a professor of international relations 
at Renmin University in Beijing, Shi Yinhong, has nicely called “smile 
diplomacy”, during the 1990s China focused on making sure that its Asian 
neighbors did not fear it and increasingly, as aid, trade and investment 
began to be added to the smiles, that its neighbors welcomed it more 
and more.13 However, what had worked for the rest of Asia has not worked 
for Taiwan. Despite growing economic interdependence between the 
island and the mainland, in most other respects Taiwan has refused to 
accommodate Beijing’s growing influence as its neighbors have (See 
Bush in Shambaugh 2005: 179).
As rapid economic growth and technological modernization enabled 
13 Quoted by Dominic Ziegler in his special report for theEconomist on China and its region, “Reaching for a Renaissance,” 
March 31, 2007, inBill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India, and Japan Will Shape Our Next 
Decade (Orlando: Harcourt, 2008), p. 43.
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China to amplify its political and military power, Beijing has become 
increasingly confident that trends in national power are moving in its 
favor. During the last decade China has been building up comprehensive 
national power, expanding its role within the international system, 
advancing its military capabilities, and adopting new strategies in order 
to restore its prestige and stature as a great power capable of ensuring 
its interests. China has leveraged the obvious power of an economically 
vibrant and growing nation of more than a billion people to ensure 
that its interests are met with due respect by regional states, without 
accentuating its growing military power (although the region is clearly 
aware of this development) (Bergsten 2006: 127). Translating its growing 
military budget (nearly US$ 132 billion for 2014) and military modernization 
into hard power, Beijing has been creating conditions that will serve its 
own interests. Using its growing naval and aerial might to more forcefully 
assert its vast claims over the oil and gas rich areas, important waterways 
and Parcel, Spratly and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, including a recent 
declaration of an Air defense Identification Zone over the East China Sea, 
China seems to be engaging in a broad-based push to lay claim to the 
entire region. Given China’s recent activities, it is evident that China strives 
to restore its great power status and in doing so has been, intentionally or 
not, moving toward regional hegemony.
Thomas J. Christensen summed up China’s strategic goals, widely 
accepted by other specialists and commentators, to include regime 
security, preserving territorial integrity, and gaining prestige, power, and 
respect on the international stage (Christensen in Sutter 2010: 7). However, 
as a great power, it has to demonstrate it is capable of preserving its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. In doing so, it has to wipe out the 
vestige of its “century of humiliation”, namely, to bring back Taiwan to 
the “motherland”. Having recovered Hong Kong and Macao, China’s 
concern over its “territorial integrity” is most associated with the (re)
claiming of sovereign control over Taiwan and continued control of the 
restive western autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet (Bergsten et al. 
2006: 119). As China considers Taiwan’s continued separation from the 
mainland a lingering legacy of its “century of humiliation”, return of the 
island to the “motherland” has become crucial to China’s self-identity, 
honor, power, and prestige. 
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China’s resolute posture toward Taiwan is evident in Beijing’s persistent 
claim it may use force to retain the island as an “integral” part of China. 
While China has been publicly and formally willing to reject the use of 
force to settle other regional issues, such as the Spratly islands dispute, it 
has steadfastly been unwilling to do so in the case of Taiwan and indeed 
has been doing everything possible to make credible its threat to use force 
in order to stop Taiwan from declaring independence (Kang 2007: 93). To 
show that it is decisive in defending its policy of “one-China”, Beijing took 
a crucial step that would codify its resolution to dissuade Taiwan from 
any possibility of formal secession. In March 2005, the National People’s 
Congress passed the anti-secession law that gives the PRC the right to 
“employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect 
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”.14 The escalation of threats to 
use force was a clear response to President Chen Shui-bian’s initiatives, 
namely, promoting a new constitution, pressing for referendums on issues 
related to Taiwan’s sovereignty, and filling an application for United Nations 
membership for Taiwan. By legally mandating the use of force to prevent 
secession, the law is designed to clear up any uncertainty over whether 
China is willing to sacrifice peace to preserve territorial integrity (Lieberthal 
2005). In December, the Chinese government sent another warning to the 
government of Taiwan, issuing a defense white paper that underscored 
the PRC’s growing agitation about Taipei’s pro-independence activities 
and a determination to halt them. The white paper warned explicitly: 
“Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt 
that constitutes a major incident of ‘Taiwan independence’, the Chinese 
people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any 
cost” (see Carpenter 2005: 111). 
The menacing tone of the legislation and white paper, accompanied by 
more than 1,200 ballistic and cruise missiles poised just across the Taiwan 
Strait ready to punish any move toward formal independence has been 
explicit warning to Taipei that China was ready to take Taiwan back by 
force should its leaders challenge the status quo in the Strait. In addition 
to being part of a campaign of psychological warfare against Taiwan, 
the legislation was designed to eliminate any lingering ambiguity in 
Beijing’s position. The Taiwanese people would be put on notice that if 
they continued to resist reunification and persisted in the “fiction” that 
14 The full text of the anti-secession law is available at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm
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the island was a country separate from the PRC, they were now in direct 
violation of Chinese law (Ibid: 109). Due to prevalent opinion in Beijing that 
Washington has sought to encourage Taiwanese independence, China’s 
harsh policy toward Taiwan also sent a direct message to the White House 
to curb Taipei’s separatist tendencies. 
Realizing that the risks of provoking Beijing were too great, voters and the 
business community in Taiwan have embraced a pragmatic policy toward 
China fostered by the KMT. Under these conditions, KMT presidential 
candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the 2008 presidential elections with a 
landslide victory. The Ma administration has focused on continuing to 
improve cross-strait relations and strengthening “soft power” approaches 
to deterrence. As the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has already 
tipped in China’s favor, Taipei believed that soft power is the only real 
weapon left for Taiwan. As cross-strait relations significantly improved, 
Taipei has cut its military spending to 2.1 percent of GDP, judging the 
current level of US$ 10.5 billion sufficient to defend the island against 
China’s efforts to force reunification with the mainland. 
Despite economic interaction, and faced with a much stronger power 
across the Strait, Taiwan’s main concern has become its survival as a de 
facto independent state. Thus, Taiwan has been careful not to neglect its 
informal alliance with the United States as a guarantor of its survival.
Considering the huge gap between Taiwan and China in terms of overall 
national power and military strength, there is not much Taipei can do to 
protect the island fully. From the rational actor perspective, the asymmetry 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is so preponderant that it is very 
difficult for the weaker state (i.e., the ROC) to maneuver alone to get the 
upper hand, even when the stronger side (i.e., the PRC) is weakened by 
some internal and external disturbances (Wu and Huang 1995: 214-215). 
Thus, Taiwan relies almost completely on the United States to balance 
Chinese power. In doing so, Taiwan has placed its trust in perceived U.S. 
benevolence. As Taiwan struggles with its declining military preparedness, 
U.S. military analysts believe that Taipei may seek to develop closer 
political ties with Washington and to acquire additional U.S. arms and 
related military assistance (see Murray with Churchman 2013: 4).
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Taiwan has always hoped that the United States would come to the 
aid of its ally if China decided to change the status quo in the Strait 
by force. Although the United States never specified it would come to 
defend Taiwan, does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country and, 
according to President Obama, “fully supports a one-China policy”, the 
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 demonstrated U.S. determination to provide 
support to the island. The TRA codified U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity”, 
emphasizing that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other 
than peaceful means … would be considered as a threat to the peace 
and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the 
United States”.15 U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” kept both China and 
Taiwan on a tight leash, deterring both Beijing and Taipei from provocative 
actions that work against an eventual peaceful resolution of the impasse. 
Meanwhile, deepening distrust of China’s foreign policy, accompanied 
by the buildup of Chinese military forces and the threat they pose to U.S. 
interests in the region, resulted with a continuation of U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan in order to strengthen its defense capabilities. According to Taiwan’s 
Ministry of National Defense, the United States has provided Taiwan with 
more than US$18 billion in defensive weapons systems since President Ma 
took office in 2008.16 In October 2008, a statement from then-presidential 
candidate Barack Obama stressed that the arms sale “helps to contribute 
to Taiwan’s defense and the maintenance of a healthy balance in the 
Taiwan Strait”17 On 21 September 2011, Washington announced an arms 
sale package to Taiwan. It was the second deal in Obama’s presidency 
after 2008, worth US$ 5.3 billion (Tseng 2013: 153).
Besides arms sales, the United States also continued training and military 
counsel to Taiwan’s armed forces. These moves are a clear reflection 
of the long defined U.S. policy that holds that strengthening Taiwan’s 
defenses is crucial to the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait. 
Although Washington had welcomed the resumption of cross-Strait talks 
and cooperation, the rapid growth of China’s military budget and buildup 
of its missiles opposite Taiwan resulted with concern among many U.S. 
policymakers in China’s intentions toward the island.
15 See “Taiwan Relations Act”, American Institute in Taiwan, Policy and Documents, available online at http://www.ait.
org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html
16 “Xi urges US to cease Taiwan arms sales”, Taipei Times, June 10, 2013.
17 “Obama welcomes arms package”, Taipei Times, October 10, 2010.
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The rise of China’s power has incited Washington to shift its attention 
and resources to the Asia-Pacific region. Seeing the Chinese initiatives 
as potentially levering China’s economic power to achieve diplomatic 
and security gains in the region, the United States has decided to 
rebalance strategic, diplomatic, and economic priorities to preserve its 
hegemony. One of the clearest articulations of the rationale and logic 
behind the rebalance is the 2011 Foreign Policy article by then-U.S. 
Secretary Hillary Clinton where she described the Asia-Pacific region’s 
importance as “a key driver of global politics”. Given the importance of 
the Asia-Pacific region to America’s future, Clinton said that “a strategic 
turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to secure and 
sustain America’s global leadership”. Clinton emphasized six key lines of 
action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening U.S. working 
relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with 
regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging 
a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and 
human rights. 
Although the U.S. seeks to integrate China more fully within the current 
world order, deep distrust in Beijing’s foreign policy has prompted 
Washington to respond to its muscular and military policy in the region. 
Thus, the pivot to Asia is a security switch aimed at discouraging China’s 
efforts to reshape the world order by the use of force or intimidation. As 
the United States likes to think that everything that happens everywhere 
is a direct threat to its security, its strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 
region has become a necessity for Washington. Under the Obama 
administration, the pivot to Asia represents a swing of the pendulum from 
“attempting to cooperate with China on global problems to pushing 
back against China’s assertiveness and challenges to international law 
and rules” (Glaser 2012: 22). 
Taking into consideration that the Asia-Pacific area remains the fastest-
growing region in the world, the pivot has been followed by the push for 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was incorporated into one of the 
six components. The TPP is the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s 
regional trade initiative that reflects U.S. trade interests in the Asia-Pacific 
region. As of June 2013, 12 countries are participating in TPP negotiations 
(Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
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New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam). The TPP 
is an example of “open regionalism”, meaning that other Asia-Pacific 
countries willing to meet TPP standards will eventually be able to join the 
agreement. The TPP not only offers a clear economic advantage to the 
U.S., but also complements the grand strategy of American rebalancing 
towards the Asia-Pacific. It will enable the Obama administration to help 
draft the blueprints for increased Asian integration and economic growth, 
cementing American leadership in the region.18
Under the new course, the Obama administration has focused more on the 
region to bolster U.S. defense ties with China’s neighbors and expand U.S. 
naval presence in the region. The so-called “pivot” away from the Atlantic 
world, Middle East, and terrorism sparked political and security initiatives 
to reassure friends and deter potential adversaries. Among other things, 
it meant giving more visibility to troop deployments, including stationing 
forces in Australia and sending the navy on exercises in the seas around 
China despite shrinking U.S. defense budgets (Tucker 2013: 44). The shift 
also involved the stationing of Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, plans 
to send aircraft to regular deployments to bases ranging from Australia 
to India, and expansions of existing airports and rebuilds of abandoned 
facilities. As alliances play a large role in U.S.’ foreign policy success, 
improving ties with allies in the Asia-Pacific region accompanied by an 
array of military bases is Washington’s best hope to rebuild its position in 
the region and to curb China’s perceived hegemonic aspirations. 
Although Clinton did not specify Taiwan per se, there was not much 
doubt that redefining and deepening old U.S. alliances and partnership 
in the Asia-Pacific included Taiwan as well. As a regional geostrategic 
pivot, Taiwan’s sensitive location is potentially vulnerable for any power 
that wants to exercise regional hegemony. Its geostrategic position gives 
Taiwan a special role in defining access to important areas in the region 
and allows it to act as a defensive shield (See Brzezinski 1997: 40-48). 
Professor I Yuan emphasizes that the United States fears a rising China and 
a military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait. Hence, it has decided to move 
back to Taiwan. U.S. military personnel are spread throughout the island, 
trying to gain an understanding of the fighting capabilities and fighting 
will of the standing army in order to make necessary adjustments. They 
18 “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Time for Some American Hustle“, The Diplomat, March 11, 2014.
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advise Taiwan’s fighting forces on how to harden the bunkers to be able to 
survive the very first round of shelling, especially to preserve the aircrafts. In 
this way, the United States is trying to help Taiwan to absorb the first strike 
in case of an invasion from the mainland.19 Thus, the United States most 
certainly will not abjure Taiwan. It is most likely that Taiwan will become a 
pawn in a great power game between Beijing and Washington. 
As for Taiwan, it seems that increased U.S. engagement in the region has 
proved useful for the island. Tamkang University professor Edward I-hsin 
Chen concluded that as a result of increased U.S. activity in the region, 
Taiwan has been relieved from China’s political pressure, has been 
affirmed as a partner, is supported as a strategic democracy, has received 
arms sales from the U.S., has expanded its international space and has 
improved its chances of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Chen 2013: 
2, 5). Despite recent good relations between Taiwan and China, Taipei 
still feels threatened by Beijing. According to professor I Yuan, since Beijing 
never gave up its military objectives, i.e. military conquest of Taiwan, Taipei 
is not in a position to trust China.20
Increased U.S. engagement in Asia initiated a security dilemma in China 
as well. However, this dilemma has a different dimension in China. The 
regime in Beijing is deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions in the Asia-Pacific 
region and remains deeply fearful of encirclement and ideological 
subversion. Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States aims 
to block China’s rise and, ultimately, undermine its one-party system of 
government (Friedberg 2012: 2). As Bergsten and others argue, many 
Chinese officials and elites are convinced that the United States will seek 
to slow or block China’s emergence as a great power – whether by 
permanently separating Taiwan from the mainland, de facto if not de jure; 
depriving China of an adequate supply of energy for its development; 
or inducing change in China’s political system. Indeed, Chinese internal 
documents commonly refer to suspicions that the United States seeks to 
“split (fenhua) and Westernize (xihua)” China … Beijing’s concern extends 
to the U.S. influence along China’s periphery, in particular the potential 
for development of anti-China blocs led by United States (or others) that 
19 Interview with professor I Yuan, research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 
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may seek to contain Chinese power or infiltrate and destabilize China’s 
minority regions (Bergsten et al. 2006: 123-124). 
After the Obama administration announced the pivot, Beijing revealed 
its discomfort with the planned increase of U.S. military presence in the 
wider region. The Ministry of National Defense in its annual white paper 
said that China had faced “multiple and complicated security threats” 
despite its growing influence, adding that the U.S. strategy meant 
“profound changes” for the region. “There are some countries which are 
strengthening their Asia Pacific military alliances, expanding their military 
presence in the region and frequently make the situation there tenser”, 
the ministry said in a clear reference to the United States.21 In Beijing’s view, 
the U.S. rebalancing strategy is a strategic move to curtail China’s political 
influence and harm its interests. China’s official Xinhua News Agency 
rejected the American “pivot”, stressing that “the U.S. sees a growing 
threat to its hegemony from China. Therefore, America’s strategic move 
eastward is aimed in practical terms at pinning down and containing China 
and counterbalancing China’s development.”22 Moreover, for Beijing 
this strategy is further evidence of the United States’ encouragement of 
Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and other neighbors in territorial disputes 
with China. Finally, the shift of U.S. attention and resources to the Asia-
Pacific region has been widely interpreted as strengthening relations with 
its formal and informal allies to encircle China and contain its rise. With 
respect to Taiwan, scholar Bruce Gilley argues that Beijing’s fundamental 
interest in Taiwan is not ideological, but geostrategic: it wants to ensure 
that Taiwan cannot be used to encircle and threaten China (Gilley 2010). 
Under that assumption, China has become increasingly suspicious of U.S. 
intentions in its neighborhood. Beijing firmly believes that Washington 
seeks to keep the PRC weak and divided to obstruct China’s rise (Tucker 
and Glaser 2011: 23).
Deep Chinese distrust in U.S. policy toward East Asia is also evident on the 
economic front. Although China recognizes greater interdependence 
and need for closer cooperation between the two countries, it is deeply 
suspicious of the TPP that includes not only trade and investment, but areas 
21 “China points finger at U.S. over Asia-Pacific tensions”, Reuters, April 16, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/04/16/us-china-defence-idUSBRE93F03P20130416
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like labor, intellectual property rights and environment in which China is 
relatively weak. China regarded this as an attempt by the United States 
to change the rules of the game by raising the bar for China. In a seeming 
rebuff of the TPP, President Hu reportedly stated that China prefers to 
work through the existing global trade architecture like the World Trade 
Organization (Zheng and Lye 2013: 52). 
Increased engagement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, military 
assistance to its allies, and ongoing U.S military consultations with Taiwan’s 
armed forces continue to frustrate Beijing’s efforts to gain control over 
Taiwan. Many Chinese officials and elites are convinced that Washington 
seeks to permanently separate the island from the mainland. China views 
U.S. involvement with Taiwan, particularly its arms sales and defense ties 
with the island, as an encouragement to Taiwanese independence forces 
and a fundamental obstacle to unification (Bergsten et al. 2006: 138). From 
Beijing’s viewpoint, this policy represents a provocative interference in an 
internal Chinese dispute. Moreover, some hardliners in Beijing support the 
theory that the United States embraced the Taiwan issue not out of some 
high principle, but rather as one way to prevent China from emerging as 
a world power (see Sheng Lijun 2001). In the words of Luo Yuan, a retired 
general and deputy secretary-general of the Chinese Society of Military 
Science, the United States has long used Taiwan “as a chess piece to 
check China’s rise” (Nathan and Scobell 2012). Under these assumptions, 
Chinese defense officials have continued to depict armed preparations 
against Taiwan as China’s top military priority. 
Conclusion
The administrations of both China and the United States often emphasize 
positive engagement and dialogues that lead to mutual understanding 
and trust. The United States still wants to encourage China to become 
a “responsible stakeholder” in the existing security, economic and 
diplomatic order. Nevertheless, clusters of highly contentious issues eclipse 
cooperation between the two powers. Beijing and Washington are at 
odds over economy, ideology, politics, sovereignty, security, and foreign 
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policy. One of the most complex issues in that cluster is certainly Taiwan. 
As Taiwan is important to both China and the United States, conflict of 
interests over the island put Beijing and Washington in a relationship 
plagued with perplexities. Moreover, a sharp escalation of tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait could provoke a U.S. show of force in support of its ally. In 
that case, only a slightest miscalculation could end in a militarized dispute 
between the two powers. While the political situation across the Taiwan 
Strait remains far from being resolved, military conflict between China 
and Taiwan is not inevitable. Were it to occur, however, it would very 
likely lead to serious political, and potentially military, conflict between 
the United States and China (Bergsten at al. 2006: 135). 
China’s recent behavior fostered a perception that Beijing was shifting 
to a more assertive regional policy and that it could quickly change its 
declared policy of “peaceful rise” toward a more confrontational one. 
The large-scale buildup of Chinese military forces directed at Taiwan, 
periodic threats by China of its determination to use forceful means to 
prevent Taiwan’s independence, and China’s assertiveness in the South 
and East China seas have raised deep mistrust in China’s intentions. 
Moreover, as China grows stronger, uncertainty about what it will do next 
may only increase.
In the last decade China has demonstrated its willingness to cultivate 
closer economic, cultural, and social ties with Taiwan in order to promote 
peaceful reunification. However, increasing economic interests do not 
necessarily coincide with political interests. Trade and other economic 
relations are one element of cooperative relations. China has shown its 
determination to prevent Taiwan’s de jure separation from the mainland. 
Beijing considers Taiwan an integral part of China, its sovereign territory, 
and thus its “core interest”, similar to Tibet or Xinjiang. As the Chinese 
elite feels that China’s status as a great power depends on unity, nation 
building, integrity, identity, political legitimacy, and national stability, the 
return of Taiwan to the “motherland” has become a critical measure to 
restore national greatness. 
Moreover, Beijing wants to ensure that the island cannot be used to 
encircle and threaten China. The fact that Taiwan is a strategic U.S. ally 
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armed with advanced weaponry is in deep contrast to China’s interests. 
Thus, it is not likely that Beijing will accept the resolution of the Taiwan issue 
that would permanently separate the island from the mainland any time 
soon. A Chinese defense white paper, released in April 2013, declared 
that China will “resolutely take all necessary measures to safeguard its 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity”.23 Therefore, it seems that 
China is ready to prevent Taiwan’s independence at all costs. Michael D. 
Swaine stresses that although China would prefer to avoid conflict over 
Taiwan, “this does not mean that it would be unprepared to go to war 
over the island” (Carpenter 2005: 118). 
Finally, given China’s increasing self-confidence about its growing 
economic and political power, and military capabilities, it is questionable 
for how long Beijing will be willing to tolerate Taiwan’s de facto 
independence. Should it become clear that Taipei has foreclosed the 
possibility of future unification, there is little doubt Beijing would take military 
action, regardless of the potential political or economic price (Bergsten et 
al. 2006: 138). Given the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, that would be the 
worst-case scenario.
It is certain that China and the United States do not intend to go to war, 
but they are preparing for an emergency. The United States and China 
are not only rivals, but also states that are deeply interdependent and 
would more likely choose cooperation over conflict. However, their mutual 
suspicion, contest for domination and conflicting interests undermine 
flourishing relations and that could drive them towards an open conflict. 
Both historical experience and contemporary politics have shown 
that increased geopolitical rivalry, military competition, or ideological 
divergence could overshadow the enmeshing bonds of commerce, 
trade, and military ties between the two powers. 
As the United States seems resolute to retain its hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific, it will continue to frustrate Beijing not only with its increased 
engagement with the region, but with the informal alliance with Taiwan 
as well. Washington will stay committed to the peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue, simultaneously staying opposed to unilateral actions by either 
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side to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Although the policy of 
“strategic ambiguity” is not an ideal solution and allows miscalculation, a 
new U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue is not in sight. Thus, the United States 
will need to continue to exercise a policy of “dual deterrence” across the 
Taiwan Strait – encouraging decision makers in both Beijing and Taipei 
to remain patient, flexible, and constructive, and to avoid provocative 
actions that work against peaceful resolution of the impasse (Bergsten et 
al. 2006: 138-139). 
As for Taiwan, the normalization of cross-Strait relations will remain the 
strategic objective. However, a more confident and decisive China calls 
for caution. Taiwan confronts the most basic threat to its security: a very 
large, powerful neighbor is determined to deprive it of its sovereignty (Cole 
2006: 32). The informal alliance with the United States is thus a necessity. In 
order to control its own fate, Taiwan has no alternative but to maintain its 
military readiness and strengthen its strategic ties with major powers such 
as the United States (Wu and Huang 1996: 223).
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